However, I have some reservations with respect to the desirpbility of @ dramatic "crash" program, as will appear below under the heading "Recommendations". Paragraph 6-d: I maintained at the time of the submission pf the memorandum of January 29, and still feel, that this paragraph if no place in a catalogue of issues that "have caused the Planning Bpard very considerable concern". Surely the employment of one of the most effective and well-established techniques in education--that of] group discussion--can hardly be fairly interpreted as a "gimmick solufion". Paragraph 6-e: ‘The foreign reaction to such a program will] probably be influenced less by the fact that such a program is conducted|than by the manner of its organization and conduct. An overdramatized launching of such a program might possibly indicate to the rest of the wofld that we anticipate an early attack by the USSR (rather than that "welhave suddenly become frightened" of one). A sober effort to increase pwblic understanding of nuclear weapons effects would, however, be likely to give OL et OF © ree ma awe aoe cee _—— Oe me Lk ‘aia eatence™ —— aan tee the impression that we are prepared to risk such an attack instead of surrendering without a struggle the fundamental liberties of the Free I cannot believe that such a discussion program would give the serious belief "that we are preparing to attack the Soviet fise toXy Wnion, and accordingly are preparing our ow people against counter-attack." It is far more likely that our weapons development programs, ouy tary build-up, and our well-publicized Operation Alert exercises of which I heartily endorse, I hasten to add) would have such ay mili- (al11 effect. Discussion of Panel's Recommendations 4h, In considering the above issues, I have been unable to free|myself of the suspicion that the Panel's recommendations have been to some extent misunderstood, I am therefore undertaking to state my own understanding qf them, distinguishing between firm recommendations and suggestions. 5. The Panel's basic recommendation for improving the psychological preparation of the people is that they become involved in the issues of national security in the nuclear age by participating in group discussions. e manner in which such group discussions are organized is of less importance, lalthough the Panel does offer the suggestion of utilizing national voluntary dssoclations. 6. The subject matter of discussion, and the emphasis given to|the vari- ous discussion items is of vital importance. On this point, the Panql is clearly advising a very broad approach. It refers to "maximum citizqn participation and involvement in the crucial issues raised by the develdpment of nuclear weapons" (p. 12), the need for the basic subject matter "to He as wes a a yopoe - broad as national security itself" (p. 12), and discussion "in an atufosphere ~he | - TOH SECRET mee ht. He Kw a Va . = : 7 Mm) Ea _% . * WE Wiese Tan