CoW. May.
‘ntroducticn ~ 2
old test series may well show up in the course of a
large-scale survey which he urges,
strongly supports.
Further,
and which 3/C
the Test Ban Treaty has
not completely eliminated fallout; relatively small and
deep
undergrouzd tescs are continuing, with occasional
venting of redizactive debris, while fallout from
current Chinese and French tests is being globally
distributed.
Peecefvl uses of nuclear explosives have
been proposed,
and a detailed survey iS now under way on
a possible canal route to parallel the Panama Canal.
In
the earlier discussions on the digging of a canal, large
nuclear explosives were considered, because of their
apparently great financial advantages,
some engineering gains.
quite apart from
Consequently, we believe that
an awareness of the problems of fallout must be maintained,
To return now to the Utah fallout; no explicit watch
was kept for iodine 132 in the early years of testing,
Since the clectreaic techniques which facilitate isotape
recognition he. not been vefined, ner was the importance
of icdime 127. recom nel.
Off-site menivors were used to
conduct syvvcys *n which the gross beta and gamma radiation
levels wore neasured,
gamma levels,
Starcing with
these gross beta and
it is possible to deduce what the iodine
131 levels must have been, provided that some important
assumptions were made.
These involve the relation of
iodine 131 activity to the gross levels and the
fractionation of the various radioactive isotopes during
the explosion.
Given these assumptions,
the calculations
are generally accepted.
Dr. Mays nas preceeded much as GNI and others did,
He admit’s the doubts as to the reliability of some of
the monitoring cuata, but nevertheless feels that is is
still necess.>>
to sec what ererco7s from the calculations,
Since thi. recogcentcl the best ve can do at this late
date,
av
7t71 dn tur.
--rliev celculations, the computed
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