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evaluation of the Russian tests by the Bethe panel that the Russian rate of progress,
es proved by their series of tests, is most impressive and that in the design of
weapons they have certainly closed the gap which existed between them and us."
He is
not 66 concerned by the immxaxuenk improvement of yield to weight ratio or the cheaper
cost of producing weapons which these developments are leading to, but is rather
impressed by the knowledge of effects of detonations at various altitudes wiich they
are gaining and which is “of extreme importance for military planning and applications.
They are avle to start working out tactical and stretegic technical concepts, it seems,
what we have been able to do in the past.”
Ulem strongly feels that our development
and testing should address the relation between rocketry and nuclear weapons rather than
the warheeds themselves.
He makes the example of designing and testing directed explesco,
Furthermore, "the effect of nuclear explosions at very
high altitudes, for example, the range from 50 miles to 1000 miles or so, are really
not much known and it is extremely important to learn about it if only because of the
whole problem of anti-ICBM defense.
in clear terms
.. . I believe that our committee should state
the necessity of a much more direct and more general engagement of the
Air Foree in space technology.
satellites and space vehicles
It is not only for ground-launched missles but for
that military problems will arise.
The connection
between this whole field and the nuclear technology should ‘be enteredinto, explored
and worked on by the Air Force."
He notes that the Russians will xpa probably deka
deploy the systems which they are testing now over the next few years but states
"from the testimony given at our meeting in Santa Monica it appears that for the next
few years a very promising retaliatory
number of MINUTEMAN missles."
system would exist in the deployment of a great
He notes that a number of these ( a thousand to fifteen
hundred) widely spaced should provide us the destructive capability against Russia that
we need during the next few years “under the assumption that the Russians do not now
have and would not have during the next few years a very efficient defense against
ICBM'S."