but to address a number of areas concerning the vulnerability and effects.
He
emphasises the limitation on yields capable as well as the slowness of the
testing, both connected with the underground capability, as requiring us to
make progress that can only be accomplished by atmospheric testing.
Generally,
he states ''Since we have not foreseen the present emergency and since we have
not planned for it, the atmospheric testing program of the spring of 1962
will fall short of accomplishing a major portion of the objectives stated above.
It is nevertheless essential that we should proceed with an appropriate testing
program next spring.
The necessarily limited results of such a series will
certainly enable us to plan a next series in 1963 ina much more fruitful manner.
There is no theoretical way which can replace the hard facts obtained from
experience.'' In the next section specifically dealing with the proposed test
series he begins ''The plan which has been worked out by the Lab Directors
and the DDR&E is the result of a careful study with which lagree."
He then
goes on to give several pages of comments on specific devices as well as
specific areas, such as high altitude effects and vulnerability in which he
wishes to make points.
Worth mentioning is that he proposes an operational
ABM test as early as possible utilizing a missile launched from the U. s. to
Kwajalein with a Nike-Zeus (
) making the intercept at Kwajalein.
Recognizing the possible political problems with the Trust Territory situation,
he still suggests that such a test be attempted as early as May or June of 1962.
In the last section of the letter, he makes general remarks and recommendations
as follows:
The series must contain a great deal of flexibility so that the
latter tests can be designed and benefit the most from the results of the
earlier tests.
As for the problems with maximizing theinstrumentation , he
notes that it looks like the Marshall Islands will not be able to be used as