-.- oa ; - 2 oe aee : (4) At 0440 nours on flerch 2, the vessol shiftcd its course. toward iy its home port of Yaizu, whore it arrived at 0600 on Merch 14, (5) In tho following two or throe days, all the crow rceportcd slight hosrdaches and some of them wore n*uscous, In 7 or 8 days, evidence of burns bth an on exposed parts of the body began to appoar, In response to certain questions which tho Amb2ssador asked the Forcign Sorvice, the following information was reccived, It shods some light on the scquence of cvents during the 2 days following the roturn of the Fukuryu Haru to Yaizu, but boforc the mishap had come to the attontion of the Embassy, weee tere eae Oe teenth ee abe (1) Tho crew first contacted the ship's owmcr, and the dircctor of the fishormen's Union, On the day of their return crow members who wore scriously effccetcd consulted a physician of the Kyoritsu Hospital, (2) Two of the fishormon, Yamamoto and Masuda, who wore in more scrious condition left tho Kyoritsu on Merch 15 for Tokyo where they visited Doctor Shimizu at the Tokyo University Hospital, (3) Professor Shiokawa madc radiation mossurements of the ship on Merch 16 and on the basis of his findings all of the crew mombcrs consultod 2 physician who recommonded that the mon bo hospitalized, TES ROLS OF THE JSPENESS SCIANTISTS During the lettor half of March the Japencso press wes fod contanually with sonsational statemonts from vepencse Scicntists, The motivations or the Japancse wore nover quite understood by us but the following. factors | mey he onumer=tog,- as pertinent to our lack of progress in dealingwith_than: (1) Ina long priveto conversation that JI had with Dr, Psuzuld at his home on the ovoning of Merch 24, he wes frank in stating his apprehension _._ that tho Amorfcan scicntists would deny him and his associatesprofessional _ recosnition duc thom for their accomplishments in tho diagnosis “and, treat— ment of the fish8rmon, He roforrod frequontly to his oxpericonce in 1945 when ne lead the teams of Japancse invostigstors into Hiroshima and Nagasaki only to have his work intcrrupted by the Occupation investigators who urdertook their own studics, in the prescnt situetion Dr, Tsuzuki soemod to acccpt my assurancés that it was the intent of the Amcrican sciontists to assist the Japancse and that all of our findings would be available to thom as teed « and could be used es they saw fit in their own publications, Dr, Tsuzuki was outwardly fricndly to both Dr. Morton and mysclf until tho time of his dcpsrturc for Geneva on March 31. Despite this, the lack of cooperation contimicd to be manifest on the part of the Japancsoe investigetors,. I do not lmow whcthor this was because wo misjudged Dr. Tsuzuki's fricndlincss, or because he lacked influcnee on his Japencso , collcagucs, , : (2) There was much evidonee of rivalry among various Japencse medical groups. In particular, tho staff at Tokyo University, ‘ioeded by ire aie were initizlly at odds with the group at the National Tnutitvte of Heslth headed, by Dr. .Kobsyashi, Morcover, the local phy sicir.ng as taigu, where ell but two of the paticnts wore hospitalized until March 29, worc anxious for various reasons that the paticnts romain thore.-' Their lsck of cooperation with tho Amcricean scicntists m2y heve beenmotivated bytheir imowlodge that the fmcricers 2dviscd that tho paticnts bo transfored to Tokyo, oO US DDE ARS3 HIVES OT be _