; (4) AL Yuu Nourse (5) In the following two or three days, all the crew reported slight its home port of Yai: -OPCN ¢, tne vessel SMlitea 1U waere it arrived at 0600 >onuo headaches and some of them were nauseous. oh 4, vurse Lowara In 7 or 8 days, evidence of burs on exposed parts 2f the bé@y began to appear. In response to certain questions which the Ambassador asked the Foreign Service, the following information was received. It sheds some light on the sequence of events during the 2 days following the return of the Fukuryu Maru to Yaizu, but before the mishap had come to the attention of the Embassy, (1) The crew first contacted the ship's owner, and the director of the Fishermants union. On the day of their return crew members who were seriously affected consulted a physician of the Kyoritsu Hospital. (2) Two of the fishermen, and ~ » who were in more serious condition left the Kyoritsu on March 15 for Tokyo where they visited Doctor Shimizu at the Tokyo University Hospital, (3) Professor Shiokawa made radiation measurements of the ship on March 16 and on the basis of his findings all of the crew members consulted a physician who recommended that the men be hospitalized. THE ROLE OF THE JAPANESE SCIENTISTS During the latter half of March the Japanese press was fed continually with sensational statements from Japanese Scientists. The motivations of the Japanese were never quite understood by us but the following factors may be enumerated as pertinent to our lack of progress in dealing with them: (1) In a long private conversation that I had with Dr. Tsuzuki at his home on the evening of March 2h, he was frank in stating his apprehension that the American scientists would deny him and his associates professional recognition due them for their accomplishments in the diagnosis and treat— ment of the fishermen. He referred frequently to his experience in 19h5 when he lead the teams of Japanese investigators into Hiroshima and Nagasaki only to have his work interrupted by the Occupation investigators who undertook their own studies. Dr. Tsuzuki seemed to accept my assurances that in the present situation it was the intent of the American scientists to assist the Japanese and that all of our findings would be available to them and could be used as they saw fit in their own publications. Dr, Tsuzuki was outwardly frierdjly to both Dr. Morton and myself Despite this, the Declassifieg (2) There was much evidence of rivalry among various Japanese medical groups. In particular, the staff at Tokyo University headed by Dr. Tsuzuki, were initially at odds with the group at the National Institute of Health, headed by Dr. Kobayashi. Moreover, the local physicians at Yaizu, where all but two of the patients were hospitalized until March 29, were anxious for various reasans that the patients remain there. Their lack of cooperation with the American scientists may have been motivated by their knowledge that DO.D Dir 5200.1 6 lack of cooperation continued to be manifest on the part of the Japanese investigators. I do not know whether this was because we misjudged Dr. Tsuzuki's friendliness, or because he lacked influence on his japanese colleagues, f Declassified DOD pir 5200.10 until the time of his departure for Geneva on March 31. the Americans advised that the patients be transferred to Tokyo. 2 PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED o \ ard