USsbrerep a cover of any kind is available or c&an be provid secondary movement is feasible. A Weighing of unless rapid rplative risks may suggest the selection of destinations for evacueks in areas where some fallout is probable rather than to attempt more radical movement in the hopes of escaping the pattern completely. This consideration would be especially valid in populipus areas where there is danger of overlapping fallout patterns, B. Shelter and Cover 1. Programs for the construction of home fhelter and the selection and marking of shelter areas as outlingd in T™ 5-1, ™ 5-5 ("Shelter from Atomic Attack" - Part 1, agd "Home Shelter for Family Protection”) should be completed espedially in target areas, along escape routes, and within satellitefcommunities. In the event that warning is insufficient to permit lives can be saved by taking shelter and by util decontamination measures until such time as pers area. The shelter program is no longer a city a reception area program; it i8 a general program since almost nofArea is free from some threat from fallout contamination. e. Beyond the range of probable blast and such “cover” as is available should be used. Tha thermal effects, best protection from residual radiation is that which places the bccupants farthest removed from the fallout particles on the ground nd roofs of buildings and which places the greatest amount off dense material between the occupants and the radioactive materi basements of homes, lower floors, of barns which Examples are y have thick stone or masonry walls, cyclone cellars, caves, ahd tunnels, Within each the most protected area or spaces shobld be designate3. Test data indicate that the radiation level. indoors on the first floor of an ordinary frame house would be about one-half the level out of doors. Greater protection would be wy | oun! I JOT @fforded by A brick DOE ARCHIVES .