ng 3. From the standpoint of evacuation, falfout may impose hazards or calculated risks in the use of certaig’ What the Civil Defense Director will be able to routes and areas. do will depend on his ability to successfully take into account fadtors such as available warning time, availability of weather aceuracy of predicted fallout patterns, size of Jnformation, gopulation to be moved, geography of the city (including traffic Janes and natural cb>structions) and location of other target citied with reference to evacuation routes, 4, It is essential that communications be dntained so that the public can be continually informed regamiing the developing situation and of civil defense activities. It be impossible to direct and control their movement in @ direction Which to them seems to be downwind, unless by means of constant] communication they a@re assured that the plan is giving them the best] opportunity to survive. 5. Evacuation plans should stress the greatest possible flexibility and mobility. It is recognized that Planning in certain functional areas requires the pre-selectiion of locations such as transportation centers and welfare reception areas. Since the use of these locations may be seriously threa—ened because of radiological contamination, such services must achieve flexibility either by increasing the numbers of such locationB, by improving the ability to operate from alternative sites, org by providing protection from fallout at the site. 6. Traffic engineering studies and specif possible) plans should receive early considerati (alternate if and continuing review. 7. Routing should be selected with referenmbe to the availability of cover enroute and at destination.| Plans must not result in concentrating large numbers of people ifh areas where no DOE ARCHIVES -13- WEORET FIT7 rm