ng
3. From the standpoint of evacuation, falfout may impose
hazards or calculated risks in the use of certaig’
What the Civil Defense Director will be able to
routes and areas.
do will depend on
his ability to successfully take into account fadtors such as
available warning time, availability of weather
aceuracy of predicted fallout patterns, size of
Jnformation,
gopulation to be
moved, geography of the city (including traffic
Janes and natural
cb>structions) and location of other target citied
with reference
to evacuation routes,
4, It is essential that communications be
dntained so
that the public can be continually informed regamiing the developing
situation and of civil defense activities.
It
be impossible to
direct and control their movement in @ direction
Which to them
seems to be downwind, unless by means of constant]
communication they
a@re assured that the plan is giving them the best]
opportunity to
survive.
5. Evacuation plans should stress the greatest possible
flexibility and mobility.
It is recognized that
Planning in
certain functional areas requires the pre-selectiion of locations
such as transportation centers and welfare reception areas.
Since
the use of these locations may be seriously threa—ened because of
radiological contamination, such services must achieve flexibility
either by increasing the numbers of such locationB, by improving
the ability to operate from alternative sites, org
by providing
protection from fallout at the site.
6. Traffic engineering studies and specif
possible) plans should receive early considerati
(alternate if
and continuing
review.
7. Routing should be selected with referenmbe to the
availability of cover enroute and at destination.|
Plans must not
result in concentrating large numbers of people ifh areas where no
DOE ARCHIVES
-13-
WEORET FIT7
rm