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— —GONFIDENTIAEC™.
——S—trhE
7. The feasibility of the program is dependent on:
a, Adequate measures for controlling test
observance in such manner as to prevent revelation
of classified information;
b, Availability of a suitable ship which
possesses adequate communications and accomodations;
ec, Availability of suitable aircraft for transportation, observation, and courier purposes; and
ad. Estimated cost of program, and availability of
funds.
6, The program is based on the premise that the special
observers involved will not have access to classified information.
It is considered necessary, however, to declassify the following
presently classified information for the special observer
program: |
a, Advance notice of the expected date of
detonation of the selected shot ‘now Confidential -
Defense Information) ;
bo. The yield of the selected shot is expected
to be (and was) several megatons (now Confidential Restricted Data);
c. The selected shot is to be (and was) an
-airburst (now Confidential - Restricted Data);
d, The code word REDWING when associated with the
1956 test operation (now Confidential - Defense
Information); and
e. Information that the test detonation has
taken place (prior to the official AEC-DOD announce-
ment )(now Confidential - Defense Information).
9. The Division of Security is concerned as to the possibility of inadvertent disclosure of classified information, but
believes that the possibility of such compromise can be minimized
with appropriate security measures which will not interfere unduly
with the objectives of the program,
Such measures will include
isolation of the special observers, carefully prepared briefings,
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