2ST (2) The imposition of censorship on military personnel only would be ineffective since a large segment of Task Force personnel in the operational area are AEC civilians and contractor personnel. It would undoubtedly create a serious’ morale problem among the military person- nel. Over-all censorship would seriously affect civilian morale and perhaps result in difficulty in employment of workers by Holmes and Narver, (3) The operational phase will be of consid- - erable length and many people will leave the operational area before completion of the operation, After these people arrive at Hawaii or the ZI, censorhip cannot be enforced. (4) Commander, Joint Task Force SEVEN has been (5) The legal complications affecting official directed by JCS to conduct Operation CASTLE on an austere basis, Additional personnel would be required to handle the censorship activity and thus impose a greater logistical burden on the Task Force, censorship would probably cause undesired publicity and focus attention to the operation as one of unusual significance, The receipt of censored personal mail by relatives and friends would undoubtedly cause speculation as to their activities and consequently, greater efforts would be made by relatives and friends to learn more about their activities. (6) There is no definite assurance that the im- position of censorship would serve to prevent all breaches of security. 4, In view of the foregoing, it is strongly recommended that: a. An official release be made jointly by the AEC-DOD prior to the forward area operations, divulging as much factual information as possible consistent with security, and other official releases be made after each test in the forward area, b. The policy of self-censorship of personal’ mail be continued without recourse to official censorship, backed up by.an intensified security indoctrination and security education and examination program, “3 DOR ARCHIVES P, W. CLARKSON Major General, USA Commander