2ST
(2)
The imposition of censorship on military
personnel only would be ineffective since a large segment
of Task Force personnel in the operational area are AEC
civilians and contractor personnel.
It would undoubtedly
create a serious’ morale problem among the military person-
nel.
Over-all censorship would seriously affect civilian
morale and perhaps result in difficulty in employment of
workers by Holmes and Narver,
(3)
The operational phase will be of consid- -
erable length and many people will leave the operational
area before completion of the operation,
After these people
arrive at Hawaii or the ZI, censorhip cannot be enforced.
(4)
Commander, Joint Task Force SEVEN has been
(5)
The legal complications affecting official
directed by JCS to conduct Operation CASTLE on an austere
basis,
Additional personnel would be required to handle the
censorship activity and thus impose a greater logistical burden on the Task Force,
censorship would probably cause undesired publicity and focus
attention to the operation as one of unusual significance,
The receipt of censored personal mail by relatives and friends
would undoubtedly cause speculation as to their activities and
consequently, greater efforts would be made by relatives and
friends to learn more about their activities.
(6)
There is no definite assurance that the im-
position of censorship would serve to prevent all breaches of
security.
4,
In view of the foregoing, it is strongly recommended that:
a.
An official release be made jointly by the
AEC-DOD prior to the forward area operations, divulging
as much factual information as possible consistent with
security, and other official releases be made after each
test in the forward area,
b.
The policy of self-censorship of personal’
mail be continued without recourse to official censorship, backed up by.an intensified security indoctrination
and security education and examination program,
“3 DOR ARCHIVES
P, W. CLARKSON
Major General, USA
Commander