,* that an . . ., individ~ did not carv any AIM RestActed lkta or other classifiedmaterialunlessauthorizedin writing@ competentauthority. A departuresecuri~ briefing,in which the continuingobligationof secrecywas emphasized,was also givenby TG 7.5 personnel. hy and Documents Photograp B. The Secur%tyControlof Material., 1. Elssionof F& sicalSecurityBranch. The primarymissionassigned to this Brauchof the J-2 Sectionwas to insurethe p~sical securi~ controlof A12ARestrictedData duringall phasesof the Task Force operations. However,thiswas not its sole task. The potection of mili~ classifiedmatterof certaincategorieswas also made part of its overall responsibiliw. Not 0+ -S it neceesarythat thoBeareas in which AEA RestrictedData was cmcentrated be safeguarded,but detailedplans for the surveillanceof the envirimsand approachesto aach locationshad to be fomulated by this Branch. To preventthe penetraticmof such zonesby unauthorizedindividuals travel control machineryhad to be designed. In addition,for hQ@ilyclassifiedmaterieland documentation being shippedfrom the mainlandto the provinggroundor being returned from the theaterto laboratoriesti the UnitedStates,a rapid and secure couriersystemwas requiredand, h order to dischargeefficient- this latterfunction,accountingproceduresfor docments and photograp~ ~ were devised. Finally,the JTF-7 individualidentlficaticm badgebecame a and *ortant neces~ mcurity controltool and its manufactureand issuancema made m assi-t of the R@.cal Securi& Branch. 2. Evolutionof Task OX’oup7s. a. Planniq. Preparationsfor the movem& 31 of fissionable