wherever. possible,to proceedto theirduty stationssubjectto the conditionthat accessto AEA RestrictedDatawodd not be permitted ~ until an AEC clearance,based on a full backgroundinvesti~ation the FBI, was granted. ‘k~ereuse of ~A RestrictedData was considered necessaryfrom the outset,en emergencyor interimclearanceby the AtomicEnergyCommissionwas sought. All personnelwho, becauseof theirduties,couldbe reasonably expectedto need accessto AEA RestrictedData were requiredto have ~’Q”clearances. Organizationcommanderswere chargedwith the responsi. bilityof determming which personnelrequiredknowledgeof such data in the dischargeof theirduties. All personnelwho umld not have accessto AEA RestrictedData but who would be assignedor attachedto the T-k Force subsequentto 1 February1948, required‘P” approval. This type of clearancewas based upon a name file and fingerprintcheckby the FBI. To insurethat all personnelstationedin the forwardareaswere either‘Qn clearedof ‘Pw approved,monthlyrostersfrom each of the Task Groupswere required. As the operationprogressed,certaincollateraltestswere approved by the JointChiefsof Staffand the names of personnelconnectedtherewith who requiredthe use of AEA RestrictedData were transmittedto J-2 for ‘Qn clearances. Also, the personnelof civilianand service laboratories which becameassociatedwith the operationfor the purpose of processingscientificfilm and test and instrumentation reports requiredclearancewhere accessto AEA RestrictedData was necessaxy. 22 SectionII s