~. iyeredeniedcredentialsauthorizingaccessto AFL. RestrictedData until the necessa~ clearanceshad been granted. o. Maximumcooperationwas affordedthe 731 and the #.EC(Office of Intelligence and Security)for the purposeof obtainingneededclearances in sufficienttime to meet criticaloperationaldates. c. Personnelwhose backgroundinvestigations disclosedevidence of disloyal~ or otherderogato~ informationwere separatedfrom the Task Force or assignedto non-sensitive duties. is the way in ‘IhowingWhO we had and where they were at all timest’ which one observerexpressedthe essenceof the PersonnelSecurityBranch job. 2. Indoctrination Procedures. ● All personnelreportingfor duty with the Task Force for tM -first time were requiredto read the penal+rovisionsof the Atomic EnergyAct and agree in writingnot to ditige operationalclassified of individualsand information.To establishpositiveidentification and characterappraisals to afforda basis for backgroundinvestigation f~=erprints,photographsand personalhistorystatementswere obtained from each individual. 3. PersonnelSecurityClearances a“ M“ It was essentialthat operatingechelonsof the Task Forcewere not deniedthe use of assignedpersonnelduringthe pericd reauiredfor backgroundinvestigation.New arrivalswere permitted, 21 SectionII P ,.