8~ provinggroundat Eniwetokwas attemptedby unidentifiedpower during the periodof the operation. It is conceivablypossiblethat submarine crew membersof passengersm~ have been able to studythe more prominent structurescomprisingthe test installations, such as the zero and photographictowersand the housingfor timingand other stationso Periscope photographsmay have been obtained. Huwever,it is most improbable that observationsof this me were productiveof any serviceableintel- ligenceinformationwhich would be classified“AEA RestrictedData” withinthe contemplation of the Atomickergy Act of 19L6. It is believed that the unusuallyeffectivedefensimsmeasuresundertakenby the Naval Task Group (TG 7.3] and by the shore-basedechelonsof the Joint Securi~ Group (TG 7.9) were successfulto a markeddegreeti keepingsubmarine fitrudersat a safe distanceor, at least,to reducet!!eir inshore sortiesto a minhum. There has been no evidencethus far disclosedthat classifiedinformation,eitherphotographic, documentaryor material,has been successfully carriedaway from operationalsites,supportinglaboratoriesor headquarters~ unauthorizedindividuals. ‘l’he presenceof hostileagenf%within the Joint Task Force itself was an ever-presentpossibili@. However,the rigid screeningimposed by the Joint Task Force personnelclearancestandards,the formidable nature of travelsecuritycontrols,the compartmentalization of information and the constanthigh stateof securitydisciplinepoint to the likelihoodthat the Wtakehomenyield of informationto such operatives 16 %otion II .