~
established snd last-minute efforts had to be taken to obtain a
sufficient number. These proved invaluable to meet the need for
rapid transportation. On one day alone, 108 personnel and 900 pounds
of freight were carried. A generous number of liaison aircraft or
helicopters for short-range transportation is a must when operating
in an area such as tiwetok.
13. The dispositionof naval vesselsand personnelnot required
on the day of firing was determined by an analysisof the predicted
activeparticles. This
drift (surfaceand air) of radiologically
predicteddriftwas calledthe Radex. It is importantthat thq
possibilities of contamination
(probableareasof contamination,
thes that a “fall-out”will occur and degreeof danger)be thorou@ly
understood prior to drawing up evacuationand re-entryplans. k
earlybriefingof principal.
comanders and staffofficersis desirable. Becausethe radex can neverbe a certainty,the plansmust,be
must be
flexibleand re-entryinto areas of possiblecontamination
centrallycontrolledin the Task Force Headquarters.
~.
The three servicesuse somewhatdiffer+snt
techniquesand
Ian@age. Operationsplans and ordersis8uedby a jotitheadquarters
must avoid “canned”languageand shouldbe in the form of general
directives. Operational.
detailsmust be left to the commandersof the
serviceunit tivolved. The originaloperationalplans issuedfor
SANDSTONEcontaineddetailsand restrictionswhich laterwere rescinded
in view of operattigexperiences.The submissionand reviewof the
32
SectionIII
.
.?