the Chief of staff, had departed for Cahu. Lt. CO1. K* L. Reaves~ US~~
who had reported for duty in ~ashington, was sent i.rmnediately
to @hu,
reporttig in early February.
Control of normal air traffic through Kwajalein was the subject of
many conferences both in Oahu and Washington. The solution to this
problemwas not agreedto untilafterGeneralBarkertsarrivslin Oahu
at the end of February,and involvedstoppageof sll trafficduring
the hours of 0001 to 0800 daily for both April and May. This solution
was adoptedas it seemd to best fit the needsof security,since
stoppageof all trafficduringtest periodsonly might have Sivenaway
the tine of the shots,which retied TOP SECREEthroughoutthe
operation. The hours selectedfor closurewere determinedby requirements for the drone planeoperationsfrom Kwajalein.
The limitedmaintenanceand aircraftparkingarea at liwajalein
couldnot handlethe requirmmts of TG 7.4 and any largenumberof
B-29?sbeing stagedthroug!!
that place. Accordingly,it was necessary
to make specislarrangements
with lieadquarters$
U. S. Air Forcesto
l~t
the stagingof aircraftthroughKwajalein.
PHASEIV
Operationsin ForwardAreas
Headquarters,
JTF-7openedaboardthe USS lit.McKinley(WC-7)
at PearlHarbor,T. H., effective@OO, 6 March 191+8.All members
of the J-3 Section(4 Officersand 2 EnlistedMen) were aboard,and
for the firstticm,the Air Force Headquarters,
Naval Task Group
17
SectionIII
.-
.