The urgencyattachedto this projectwas occasionedby the necessity
of procuringthe necess~y materialsand allocatingshippingspaceto
them for theirmovementto the site. However,as later eventsdeveloped,
it was tipossibleto firm-upany requirements
byl November1947(which
had been establishedas the deadlinedate in JCS 1795/6). The delay in
firmingthese requirements
wae mainlydue to threefactors: (1) the
high securityclassification
of the informationdesired;(2) the lack
of adequatedirectliaisonbetweenthe JointTask Force and the servtie
agenciesconcerned,which resultedin the unfamiliarity
of the services
with the purposeof the test; and (3) the completelack of technical
Imowledgeof nuclearphysicson the part of the JointTask Force staff.
However,at a meting on October~, whichwas attendedby all interested
agenciea,a great deal of progresswas accomplishedin eliminating
duplicatingrequirementsand testsnot consideredfeasible.
Upon the departureof GeneralHull and his partyon a,reconnaissanceto Eniwetok,work on preparationof a plan to cover the entire
operationof the Jotit Task Force throughthe actualtest days was
initiatedby the J-3 Section. It was decidedto use the form of an
Army FieldOrder with the necessary.Annexes,
each Annex to be prepared
by the Staff Sectionhavfngprimaryinterest. A draftof the proposed
FieldOrder, togetherwith four of its Annexes,was preparedand ready
for approval.
upon GenerslHull~sreturnto Washingtonon 1 November
1947. ~Vithcertainchanges,it was apprmed, published,and distributed
by the AdjutantGeneralon 14 November1947. Althoughfrequentlater
5
SectionIII