CHAPTER 14.1 GENERAL The isolation of the Project, though important for scientific purposes, led to the major handicap in supply. Logistics were greatly complicated by the fact that the Project site was not located on any established commercial maritime route nor on any commercial air route. The avenues of supply were limited to either military surface and air transportation facilities or to the use of privately chartered merchant shipping and chartered air carriers. It was, however, the policy of the AEC that the Contractor make maximum use of transportation facili- ties of the military establishment; and although the Contract permitted the supplemental use of commercial facilities, maximum emphasis was placed on the use of military transport. The distance of the site from adequate sources of supply of personnel or material was such, however, that their delivery by military surface shipping required a period of fifteen to twenty days from the time of departure from Oakland to the time of arrival at Eniwetok. Also, under postwar conditions of maximum military economy and under the later duress of Korean war conditions, there was frequent conflict among all agencies for available space on established military transportation facilities. The logistic problem was further complicated by the absence of any established commercial communication facility, but perhaps the most serious complication of all resulted from the radical and sometimes unanticipated changes in the scope of the Project. These changes, which were usually of the greatest degree of urgency from the point of time and which at times altered the entire logistic schedule as applied to both personnel and material, provided uncertanties of long range forecasting and scheduling. Since it was realized that logistics would constitute an important factor in the success of the entire Project, and since many of the pro- blems connected therewith would require a thorough kmowledge of military Shipping procedures and a close liaison with various military head- quarters in the Pacific area, the firm obtained on July 5, 1949, the services of a retired Navy Commodore who had served as Chief of Operations on CincPac's steff during the war, and who was well equipped to supervise transportation operations and other problems which might arise in connection with H & N relations with military authorities, AVE 0, Because of the nature of the Marshall Islands with their sparse population, undeveloped resources, and insignificant value as trade centers, no steamship line has considered them sufficiently attractive from the point of view of revenue to justify their inclusion as a regular port of call for cargo or passenger service. They are so far removed from the regular trade routes between the United States and Japan or between the United States and Australia that it has not appeared economically feasible to divert commercial steamers from either of these routes to Eniwetok. 14-1