publicly available information is still classified, or that there is a difference
as to who ypu are or what position you hold in determining whether you may
waive standing secugiéyrequirements.
In a similar veinis the classification of the fact of an airdrop. Experience has demonstrated that the crew of a drop aircraft operates under
such pressure during a drop test that code communications are not practical for transmitting essential {nformation for operational and safety purposes. Therefore, airdrop information is transmitted in the clear over
.
radio, which definitely indicates the fact of an airdrop and bomb-release
time. According to the guide such information would be graded Confidential
Defense Information but, as noted, it is practically handled as unclassified.
*In other words, the guide is waived for practical purposes but leaves
the individual members of the Task Force subject to the threat of security
violation for similar handling of the information. It is completely disconcerting when one reads in a news magazine the fact of a classified airdrop
and the increased accuracy of that drop over the drop publicly announced.
Mention should be made of the fact that there is a definite difference
of opinion between AEC Washington and the several field groups in the use
of Top Secret. Information which is routinely handled as Secret, a very
high level of classification, at home stations and during field operations is
often graded Top Secret at the Washington level.
Such information cannot
be graded Top Secret and have operations continue in the field.
In one
situation a Top Secret RD teletype was received containing only information
that would have been graded, according to existing guides, no higher than
Confidential Defense Information,
*An illustration of the use of security classification for reasons of administrative privacy with the danger of entrapment of personnel was the
classification of the inaccuracy of theEMMICherokee) drop. It was
an open shot observed by uncleared newsmen with the general knowledge of
- all participants of the open nature of that detonation. It was also common
knowledge that the detonation missed the target by a substantial distance.
The decision to make the fact of that miss Confidential Defense Information
not only seemed inconsistent with the fact of an open shot and the general
philosophy for classification of information, but also failed to recognize that
such incidents cannot be kept from the public even though an attempt is
made to identify such information as affecting the national defense and security, with threatened prosecution for any public leak. Past experience was
confirmed by the information leaking at a number of points. The use of
security classification for reasons of administrative privacy undermines the
security program internally as well as in the view of the American public.
*The fact that the open shot provided access by uncleared newsmen to
the atoll and its installations has changed a long standing situation so that
-~ 120 -
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