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Other types of negative be-
of society would be extremely grave—so grave as to render questionable its ability to recover n time to
respond constructively to the Nation’s requirements. The death or disappearance of many of he recog-
nized leaders, the destruction of manyof our established institutions, and the loss of communit r facilities
and public utilities would critically weaken our social fabric. The physical destruction of the complex
nervous system of our society—transportation, communications, and supply—would in turn be prievously
aggravated by the negative attitudes and behavior of many of the uninjured survivors resufting from
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the unimaginable horror with which they would be confronted.
There would be, of course, some types of positive, constructive reaction and behavior.
If any dis-
aster, there are varying degrees of emotional adaptation. As was repeatedly learned in the U.S Strategic
Bombing Survey, people always seem to be able to bear more hardship than they think they ran. The
basic human will to survive is strong, and it has positive as well as negative behavioral effectg. In any
disaster, there are individual acts of heroism and devotion to duty. In times of great stress, the is usually
discernible among some people a heightened sense of morality, of increased identification wit spiritual
goals and ideals.
The religious conviction of many of our people would be a major source of strength.
The recognition of much urgently needed work to be done would be an important morale:
timulant.
Furthermore, new andeffective leaders of communities would emerge.
It is our considered opinion, however, that initially these positive factors would be overwfelmed by
the negative ones, and that without drastically improved preparation of the people for such an event,
the negative factors would persist sufficiently long to jeopardize the continuation of our na ion as an
integrated society.
It should be emphasized that the same weaknesses in the psychological preparation of he people
that would result in negative behavior following attack make them psychologically vulner
le at the
present time, To the extent that they lack knowledge and real understanding of basic natio
security
considerations, they are in danger of accepting wild exaggerations and misinterpretations of ne ws events.
Furthermore, they are morelikely to believe unfounded rumors and to react to them in inappropriate ways.
A Program of Psychological Defense
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Wesharea firm belief, however, that the prospect is not a hopeless one. Webelieve thatit is possible
to prepare effective psychological defenses, and that in even as shorta period as three years pin be
possible to effect a sufficient change in the preparation of the American ‘people to warrant a s nificantly
more optimistic estimate. It will not be accomplished easily; resistance to’ change will need oO be overcome on many fronts, and successful efforts will need to be substantial ones.
In our opinion, the keystone of the program is knowledge—not merely information made ‘available,
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but information, both frightening and hopeful, so successfully conveyed as to become useful knowledge,
translated into plans, procedures, and the capability for constructive action. It has been wisdly said, we
think, that courage is based on knowledge of the groundsof fear and hope.
In order to prepare the people, we believe that it will be necessary to involve them, and to involve
them at deeper levels than mere factual information. They will need to have, to some degref, the same
type of experience we have had in our current undertaking. Weall resist change and requ#e prodsto
progress. Weall alike learn to do by doing, and we learn why by talking our purposes out ‘Attempts
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lower workefficiency, absenteeism, hostility, selfishness and opportunism.
havior, individually more disruptive, would doubtless occur, but they would constitute a less serioug national
problem since they would be muchless widespread. In this category would be: panic,riots, pillage, rape,
subversion, sabotage, espionage, exploitation, etc. (These might be expected toincrease in time, however,
if the social disorganization persists.) In arriving at this judgment of behavior, we have be soberly
aware of a tendency to overestimate negative reactions—as the British did prior to the bombi B attacks
in World War I]—but westill think that this ts a valid judgment.
With the present state of public knowledge and expectation, we believe the blow to the organization
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