2. For future operations it is recommended thatthe airlift for phasing personnel out of the Forward Area be committed by MATSat the earliest possible date so that roll-up can be efficiently planned and executed. 3. In an operation requiring widespread camp areas for large numbers of personnelof the Scientific Task Group, it is recommended that administrative sections be established at these locations to assist our personnelin obtaining housing, messing, and transportation. For example, it would have been advantageous to have had an officer and an enlisted man of the J-1 Section at Kwajalein to keep necessary population figures and other administrative records. At Eniwetok a J-1 Section representative should be stationed at the upper island camp to perform these functions. When a campis established at Bikini, a J-1 representative should be assigned there. 3.19.2 J-2 Section, Security 1. It is felt that the identification system (relative to badge inserts) utilized for Operation Ivy was cumbersome owing to the variety of color combinations used. It is recommended that a simplified color system indicating general operating areas be utilized in forthcoming operations. A letter or numeral system could be used to indicate clearance status and for access to areas where entry requires a close scrutiny of the badge. Such areas where the letter or numeral system is used would be small enough not to require the guard to be able to distinguish a badge color at a distance. A letter or numeral could also be used to designate a photographer, etc. Such a system would be less confusing to guards and operating personnel. It is further recommended that the identification system be established as early as possible during the planning stage of each future operation to enable early procurement of necessary supplias and to enable the J-2 Section, TG 132.1, to indoctrinate the security sections of Headquarters, JTF 132; other Task Groups; and the guard forcein its utilization and implementation. Some confusion existed among the various Task Groups owing to the inability to indoctrinate properly the various security sections and guard forces in the use of the Ivy identification system. 2. One of the more serious difficulties encountered during the operation was that of procuring information relative to the status of pending clearances for participating personnel, particularly military personnel. It now appears that the system, whereby the parent organi - zation of an individual processed the necessary paper work up through the channels of the organization to eventually reach the Washington staff responsible for processing clearance matters for that particular organization, resulted in too frequent delays and inability to determine the status of a particular clearance prior to its being received by the AEC, Washington, for transmittal to the FBI. In future operations it is recommended that forms being processed for clearance be forwarded through the Scientific Task Group Security Officer, who would in turn forward them to AEC, Washington. 3. It ig recommended that a representative of the Security Section contact all Program Directors to coordinate and indoctrinate these various units in the security requirements of forthcoming operations. 4. It is recommended that a security assistant be assigned to all Forward Area opera- tional locations. This need was made apparent during Operation Ivy by the difficulties encountered at Kwajalein in administering the TG 132.1 security program there. 5. For future operations the departure of personnel from the Forward Area immediately following a shot should be coordinated by the J-1 Section with the J-2 Section so that necessary security agreements can be secured from such personnel prior to their departure. 3.19.3 J-3 Section, Plans and Operations 1. Recommendations concerning the sample-return flights for a future operation are based on the assumptions that a. Headquarters, TG 132.1 will be located at Parry Island. b. Test material requiring expeditious return to ZI installations will be recovered at “$1