technical discussions on methods of detecting underground shots."'
Meeting #1572, 11 December 1959:
Here are a few short but important remarks on the need for weapon
testing in the progress of the Test Ban talks:
''McCone stated that the
JCAE fully supports the Commission's position onthe importance of
adequate safeguard positions in any test ban agreement with the
Soviet Union.
He said Senator Anderson had urged that the Commission
be ina position to test a number of devices immediately after the first
of the year or as soonas the test moratorium is ended.
For example,
Senator Anderson said that he understood from Norris Bradbury that
the Polaris warhead re yuired further testing before it would be safe
for stockpiling.
Mr.
Mr. McCone said he had later discussed this with
Bradbury who stated that Senator Anderson was not accurately
reflecting his views on the safety of the Polaris warhead. Mr. Bradbury
said that he did not mean that the warhead was
one
stockpiling.
Mr. Luedecke/
too unsafe to permit
mentioned
.
.
that there seermed to be a misunderstanding
among administration officials/
about
the progress of work on tunnels for
underground weapons tests. He said that he understood that work was
proceeding on schedule, however, he would investigate the matter further."
3
Meeting #1579,
15 December 1959:
On the subject of Geneva negotiations (AEC 226/229), Starbird reviewed
a proposed AEC position on the test ban for high altitude in a phased test
ban treaty.
Guidance was needed from the Commission ona staff pr-posal
103