wre te
P apers, 1953-6
1953 1 :©
(Ann Whitman file)
Eisenhower:
. .
.
oe
me
proposal for political considerations.
fa ae
The Soviets had lsid dow
two conditions: (1) that the Soviets have complete access to the
detonator and (2) that they have the right to fix the number of
tests and their strength. Subsequently, after Mr. McCone had consulted with the Joint Congressional Committee, the U.S. made a
proposal that the Soviets, the British, and the U.S. put up de-
vices which would be subject to manual and visual inspection by
all. The Soviets rejected this proposal. The President, continued
Mr. Herter, had written Prime Minister Macmillan setting forth a
fall-back position.
With respect to declassification, Mr. Herter
pointed out that the AEC has the right to declassify but that then
the information would be available to the whole world.
It might
be possible to obtain limited declassification authority from the
Congress.
Mr. Herter explained that there were two alternatives in
the three-page paper which had been distributed at the Council
table that morning.
The first was to offer the fall-back position.
However, this was subject to certain disadvantages: (a) it would
be unfavorably received by the Joint Committee; (b) it is doubtful
that authority could be obtained at this brief session of the
Congress; and (c) there would be a hazard that, if the Soviets
accepted the proposal, we might not be able to go through with it.
A second alternative would be to stick to the reciprocal offer. If
the Soviets refused it, then the U.S. could go ahead with the underground test serfes on its own.
As for the date for beginning the
underground test series, Mr. Herter said that to set a definite date
might have the appearance of an ultimatum and that perhaps we could
say "shortly".
He said thet a political decision had to be taken,
and that meanwhile the Geneva negotiations were dragging along. Mr.
Herter referred to the statement made by the President at a press
conference that there would be no shots in the atmosphere while he
was President. Mr. Herter concluded by saying that there was talk
in Geneva about a recess, and that Wadsworth was on the way home to
replace Ambassador Lodge in the UN.
The President observed that advance Congressional authority
was not needed if the fall-back position was put forward "subject
to Congressional authorization", and inauired whether Secretary
Herter had talked to the British.
The Secretary said that he had
not yet done so.
The President said it would alarm the British if
we went shead alone and Mr. Herter said that of course we would
consult with the British.
The President suggested that the fali-back position would not
hurt us badly and inquired whether we would really be giving anything
up if the Soviets accepted. Mr. Herter said we would not.