\ i (5) The sources of information on transient shipping, soupled with the Danger irea molification discussed above, were aiequate for orctece tion of all surface shipping following the Arst shot. (6) Advance plans for evacuation of the. ENTWSTOR camps ant nitive stolla for fall-out were adequate. (7) Ship operstian im ths alot atslL Lagcort was not a serious somtamination problem, Setafled s-mpling of the lagcon water st critical locations and countermeasures taken by ships! crews were ademiate bo cope with the operational nudsance encountered. _ ivailable evidence indicates that contamination in the lagoon waters concentrited on downwind reefe and "in the lower levels of the lagoon. Since no viclent storms were enccuntered on the operation, the effects of such disruptions in producing miform aixing of the ccrtaminstion are wnknow, (8) The relations and agreements develcopet for the mutual dis— charge of CINCPAC (CINCP.CFLT)/JTF SEVEN responsibilities relative to tie safety of Pacific populations were adequate. Minor exceptions are indicated velow (a) Native populations were not briefed is advance on the general aspacts of the operation, to include approximate starting date of the éperstion, gross phencmena waichwould be manifested, possibilities of hazardous conditions requiring evacuation and general native premrations to coatralise and anticipate evacuation. (bd) Mative atolls were act provited with manned monitor stations and fila badges. (9) The 4RSH'LL Talands in the southwest quadrant were originally considered to be in a favorable loeation with respect to fali-cut. |