one such officer remaining excessively on duty without rest. The necessity for preparation of displays, advisories ani foreceste and maintaining a perfodie Command Briefing schedule through about H minus 3 hours, fcllowed by at least 2 twelve-nour post—ehot period of detailed analysis of the close= in and longerange falleout aspects of the shot, ani the preparation of eddie tional advisories and directives, were not compatible with the assignment of one officer to this duty, Althodgh "additional duty" officer personnel were available to assist during the critical shot days, these pecple were neither available between shots to scarry through on documentation of the shots and preparation of historical material, nor can it be expected that similar per sonnel will be freely available in the future for even the critical shot days, The amount of between=-shct work that, could be properly completed was limited, Extensive preperation of documentary and historical material, while setiil fresh in ths minds of the participants, could not be properly accomplished ‘with the available personel. Further, clerical assistance was aiequate only through excessive ami frequent after-ticurs duty, - (2) The shot phase stage of development of the dynamic fall~ ‘out plot (par 1 ¢ (3)(e) above) was such that approximately <ne and one-half to two hours work was required by ons man to complete the forecast. although, this time factor can undoubtedly be improved, the fact remains that, within the tins limits available for preparation of material for an operational deeieion, additional responsible personnel must be available to prepare other material needed for the decision, (3) The preparatica of the dynamic fall-out plot requires the full-time assistance of a weathor forucaster familiar with tho long range air particle trajectories snd with at least tha general nature of the fall- 99 |