at least SOK of the dose rate seer during the period of "shine" and fall-out, @. Radsafe Survey - (1) The plan for cloud. tracking to sweep critical areas rather than to follow all segments of the cloud was adequate ant well within the Continuous analywis of the raw date capabilities of the aircraft available. received through in-flight reports was the primary method of rapidly deter= mining the relation between forecast ami actual particle trajectories, This information, combined with reports from ground monitoring stations, mde possible rapid gensral determinations of fall-out patterns after each shot, (2) Manned monitor stations on the several islands were very useful to assist the post-shot evaluation of fill-ouwt and to augment the sys= tem of aerial radsafe reconnaissance. In sams cases the scale range of the radiac instruments was inadequate arxt was corrected. Although the BRAVO event indissted that mre stations were needed, perscanel and self-sufficient housing end commnications equipment were oct ivailable during the shot phase to put them in operation. Also, the absence of critical populations after BRAVO, made such stations less urgent. The existing ne@work of stations, equipped with appropriate instruments and coommicstions facilities, provided & valuable safeguard for populated areas within five hundred miles of the shot site. (3) The use of routine operational and test aircraft to assist in the definition of Sll<out areaa on the shot atoll and between ground sero and the task forve fleet was inadequate. It was found necessary to divert WB-29 eloud tracking aircraft to make low-level sweeps between the ships snd the shot atoll and to assess the physical amd radsafe damage to the BIKINI airstrip.