ENIWETOK for all BIKINI shots, At BIKINI the original plan to leave a firing party in the firing bunker on NAN was discontinued subsequent to BRAVO for safety reasons, No personnel were left on any other BIKINI site for any of the BIKINI shots. The problem of protection of task force persennel was solved as follows: a. Personnel in the BIKINI area were completely evacuated (except for the firing party on BRAVO). Disposition of ships was made such that all personnel would be in the most favorable position with respect to the wind pattern and fall-out area and sufficiently distant so as to be safe from blast and thermal effects. Additionally, cleud tracking efforts were nain- tained to detect, in advance, areas of potential radioactive hazard up-wind of task force ships, b. Since the ewacuatian of the primary camp at ENIWETOK Atoll as a result of fall-out from BIKINI shcts would cause considerable expense, effor and subsequent delay in the operation, the wind patterns for the shots were carefully examined for possible adverse fall-out effects in the direction of ENTWETOK, In addition, as discussed in paragraph & under cleud tracking, a careful post-shet check was made of the air space between ENIWETOK and BIKINI in order, if required, to give adwance warning ef hazardous contamination likely to drift amd fall-out on ENIVETOX. Lastly, a system cf collection and reporting of Radsafe informatien from all populated areas of ENT.ZTCK Atell was placed in effect from Hehour to at least H plus 24 hours, extended as required by special circumstances. It should by noted that primary re- liance was placed upom the examination of forecest and observed wind patterns, plus the cloud tracking effort, inasmuch as these actiens provided the maxtoum advance warning of potentially hazardous conditions up-wind of ZNIWETCK, 47