rere ee kid wht. a ny CONFIDENT+AL c interpreted to mean that civil defense had failed in its mission: ‘It [the declaration] suggested finitely that the Civil Defense organization would be overcome with paralysis within 36 hours. The simulated situation deteriorated so rapidly that the President, who apparently recognized the approaching paralysis, was forced to declare a state of nationwide Martial Law.” At the other extreme, Dr. Charles Fairman, Professor of Law at Harvard University, testifying before a Congressional committee, described the declaration as ‘unstudied,’ ‘“‘hashed up” for the occasion, and “falls apart upon examination.” He went on to state: “Operation Alert bungled into crude compulsion where insight, administrative skill, and inspiring leadership were needed.” ? However the moveis interpreted, the declaration of martial law emphasized the fact that the Army would be called on to play a larger role in the postattack period than had hitherto been madeexplicit.* Adequate passive defenses, like adequate active -defenses, strengthen our general posture for war. If the us and the Soviet Union have equal capabilities in air defense and offense, a decided advantage will go to the nation with the best-developed passive defense system. In this regard the nation that can place its population in shelters possesses a basic advantage. An aggressor may be greatly deterred if he cannot be sure of striking a truly crippling blow. Public funds must be apportioned between the various active and passive programs constituting the air defense system; this study summarizes oro findings on the feasibility, effectiveness, and costs of some ingredients of an effective passive defense system. CHOICE OF TARGETS It was felt advisable to make a detailed study of a single urban target (Washington) and generalize from this study to the degree indicated by more cursory studiesof five other urban centers: Boston, Dayton, Milwaukee, St. Louis, and San Francisco. The Washington metropolitan area was chosen as a primary test subject because, as the national capital, it was considered to have high priority as a target; its geographical features presented difficult, but not insurmountable, problems for solution; its proximity to ORO madeit an économical subject for study; and a high degree of interest and coopera- tion from civil officials and other citizens promised to promote ease of study. The other five cities were chosen to represent a variety of conditions that might influence civil defense actions. Boston was chosen because of its relatively large size and because water and adjacent targets imposed limitations on preattack movement. Dayton represents a smaller city where there is comparative freedom to movein any direction, and as an inland city it has a greater probability of receiving longer warning periods of im- pending attack. Milwaukee and St. Louis were chosen as larger inland cities, the former being limited in possible movement by Lake Michigan. Since both cities have been objects of Fcpa studies, it was thought that further comparisons might be possible. San Francisco was chosen because, unlike the other targets studied, it is situated on the West Coast. *Project LINEUP ! is an exhaustive study of the roles the military forces might play in the civil defense effort. Recognizing that the existing civil defense structure may well collapse, it recommends a strong national civil defense command structure (as opposed to the present advisory functions of Federal Civil Defense). Supporting this hierarchy would be mobile support units composed of men not suited for active military training because of physical disabilities, family responsibilities, religious scruples, etc. These units would reduce the drain on Army resources (which would not be adequate to meet the effects of the widespread attack postulated in LINEUP in any event) and release large numbers of Army personnel to perform their primary mission. 8 ORO—R-—-17 (App B)