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‘wrISTORICAL INSTALLMENT NO. I
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S“CTION I
ORGANIZATION
A,
FRE-ACTIVATION "IA'NING AND DEFINITICN CF TH? MISSTOX
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The December 1951 report of ths Commander, Joint Task Force 132, -
to tie Joint Chiefs of staff stated that duriny Cveration IV7 it would
be recessary to evicuate all personnel, excepting a specially rrotected
firing party, from Fniwetok Atoll during both: shots.
Theoretically, re-
enwry into the area was conterrlated to he at D rlus 5 ami D plus 15
dars for the first and second shots respectively. mis amounted to a
tctal of twenty days afloat.
‘lowever, for the purposes of planning and
fer allowing for any continzencie; not theoretically anticips‘ed, the
prssible total length of tire afloat was set as being anywhere be-
treen fifteen to forty-five days.
During the evacuation periods it would
b: necessary that task force and contractor personnel normally based
ashore be quarted and subsisted aboard naval vessels.
This meant, of
course, that substantially more naval forces than employed during Operation
iRE“NROUSE would be required, with the possibility that certain reserve
fleet vessels would have to be activated not being overlooked.
Further,
it was necessary to prepare an additional plan for re-establishing the
task force at an alternate de-tination in the event re-entry ‘into the
Atoll was not poasible or practical, which, in turn, was another possible
utilization of naval suprort.t
The same report outlined the nature of the Navy's mission in Operation
IVY and the requirements arising therefrom.
BEST AVAILASLE COPY
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1.
Frimarily,
CITF 1322's Revert to the Joinw “niefa o2 7 S# Aeced 1] December 1952.
.taces 5-6
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