which had been withdrawn. Should we also undertake to replace other
Egyptian contributions? Mr. Dulles thought that to do this would be
ea mistake if we acted before we had determined our whole policy approach to the area.
The President asked the State Department to get busy at
once and examine with the Department of Defense just what it was
that these countries wanted by way of support and assistance from
theUnited Statesand what ourGovernment oughtto do next. |: 2>1r231
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NOTE:
2.
The following actions, numbered 2 and 3, were separated into two actions, instead of being one action
on the DCI's briefing.
The National Security Council:
Noted and discussed an oral briefing by the Director of
Central Intelligence on the subject, with specific reference to developments in the Soviet ballistic missiles program; the situations in Indonesia and North Africa; the
recent election in the Sudan; and recent develomments in
the Middle East.
3.
POSSIBLE U. S. ACTIONS IN SUPPORT OF PRO-WESTERN NATIONS IN
THE NAR HAST
The National Security Council:
Noted the President's request that the Department of State
in consultation with the Devartment of Defense, as a matter
of urgency, explore what types of U. 5. support might be
given to the governments of Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and
Saudi Arabia if required in the immediate future, and examine possible actions which the United States might take
if requested to give such supfort.
The above action, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretaries of State and
Defense.
77
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Bee.
~~
*
NOTE:
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