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TOP SECRS7
The President observed that a military commander had to
take economic information into consideration at various times, as,
for example, when he made a battle plan.
Mr. Brundage inquired whether these reports on economic
information should more properly come to the military from depart-
ments such as Commerce and Agriculture, and the President replied
in the affirmative.
General Cutler next turned to draft NSCID No. 7, and
briefed the Council generally as to its content. He then called
upon Mr. Alien Dulles, who stated that neither the plan nor the
expense statement referred to on this subject were his own. He
said that the Hull Board very wisely put its finger on the Achilles’
heel of critical intelligence--namely, the unsatisfactory situation
which existed relative to delays in the transmission of such intelligence to Washington. He said the intelligence community had been
working hard on this problem, and that it proposed the establishment
of relay centers at critical points abroad so that when critical intelligence was received at these relay centers, it covld be anutomatically and rapidly forwarded to the Seat of Government.
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Mr. Dulles took note of the objections of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff to the NSCID as drafted by the inteLligence community. He
suggested that the Council, instead of adopting draft NSCID No. 7;
direct certain studies to be made along the lines mentioned in Mr.
Dulles' memorandum of January 28, 1958, to the Executive Secretary,
Nc.
In response to Mr. Dulles' request for comments, Dr. Killian mentioned the study made by the President's Board of Consultants
or Foreign Intelligence Activities. This study reflected serious delays--sometimes 50 hours or more--in getting critical intelligence to
top-level consumers in Washington. Dr, Killian said that in the first
instance this was a management problem, for priorities must be established in order that the most inportant information should get into
the communications system quickly, and so that trivia would be ruled
out of that system. It was his view that this management study should
be made before we committed any funds for additional communications
network facilities.
General Cutler, after citing the views expressed by Secretery Quarles in his memorendum to the Council dated March 10, 1958,
proposed that action on draft NSCID No. 7 not be taken at this time.
In lieu thereof, he thought it would be well to request the Director
of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense to submit an
agreed program to implement the idea of accelerating the transmission of critical intelligence. Mr. Dulles agreed with this proposal.
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