Because living conditions deteriorated further
the United States instituted small trust funds.
For the Bikinians, the trust fund yielded semi-annuai
interest payments of approximately $15 per person.
lier showed a marked increase in the

amount of radioacuve nuclides in the
people's bodies. These tests show
that tne Bikinians were ingesting
higher than acceptable concentratloms of cancer-causing radiation
from the water und from food grown
in the island's contaminated soul.
The U.S5. government then began
importing all food (except local fish.

which was declared safe) and dnnk
to Bikini. This food program has

compounded the Bikini dilemma:
while the Bikintans have been told

that the island is radioactive and po-

tentialis dangerous. the prospect of
tree food and housing and a chance
to move trom Kili—called the
“prison by residents—-has encouraged peuple to returm.
In eurty 1978. the Energy Research and Development Association considered moving the peopie to
another island in Bikini Atoll—

Eneu—nd was growing fruits and

vegetaties in an experimental garden
to test radioactivity levels there. Re-

sults from these experiments. however, werent expected for about a
year.

According to a careful report in
the Los Angeles Times. by February
1978 it was otficial governmentpolicy: Bikini was unfit for people to
live on. Nevertheless. in Apnl. Trust
Territory officials, testifying at a

congressional hearing on funding for
re-establishing the Bikinians on
Eneu Island, insisted that the people
could remain on Bikiniwithour harm

until the expemments on Eneu were

completed in January 1979—provided that they didn’t eat any
coconuts. and that the coming medi-

cal tests showed. as was expected,

no large increases in internal radiation levels.
In the April 1978 medical examinations, however. the Bikinians’ inter-

nal radiation levels ranged up to

0.980. or nearly mvice the U.S.
maximum satety standard of 0.5
rems. At the same time. the preliminary resuits trom the expertmental garden at Eneu Island
showed that radioactivity levels

were 5 to 6 times higher than expected.
Throughout the rehabilitation of
Bikini. the Energy Research and
Development Association and the
Department ot Energy had conducted countless radiological sur-

vevs of the island—-many of which

suggest the Bikinians were unwitting
subjects for scientific radiation tests.
A recent study for the Departmentof
Energy concluded that ‘Bikini Atoll
may be the only global source of data
on humans where intake via ingestion is thought to contribute the
major fraction of plutonium body
burden.
A 1976 Lawrence Livermore Laboratory scientist stated that Bikini
“is possibly the best available
source of data for evaluating the
transter of piutonium across the gut
wall atter being incorporated into
biological systems.”
Government scientists vehemently deny they have used the

Marshallese for experimentation. A
DOE official explained. “It was done
by technical tvpes anxious to know
about the transfer of radioactive elements.

Intenor Department officials an-

nounced in May 1978 that the atoll
would be evacuated within 90 days.

and the people returned to Kili Island. [n late August. [nterior repre-

sentatives went to Bikini to supervise the evacuation, in many ways
reminiscent of the i946 removal.

“There are some things we didn't
feel good about,” said Taro
Lokebal. who serves as liaison between the Bikini Council and the
United States. ““The (U.S.) High

Commissioner made the people

rush. ... Some things were
behind—pigs. chickens, lumber.
had to have our ceremony on
ship. [t was supposed to be on
shore but we had no time.”
Though the Bikinians. like

left
We
the
the
the

Enewetakese. suffered the devastating physical and psychological ef-

fects of relocation and, at times.
even near starvation, they had never

suffered radiation exposure until

they returned to their radioactive 1s-

land atter 25 years. Nowthe Biki-

nians are an exposed population.
too. And who knows what the future

holds for the Enewetak people—

many of whom have now retumed to
their home atoll to work with
thousands of U.S. armysoldiers in
the massive nuclear debris cleanup.
Until the scientifie community and

independent organizations begin cnt-

ically to monitor U.S. government
agencies’ treatment of the Marshallese, their situation is not apt to
change.
From the nuclear bomb tests at

Bikini and Enewetak to the medical

treatment ofthe irradiated islanders.

the 30 years of Amenican trusteeship
has brought the Marshallese any-

thing but the conditions promised in
the U.N. trust agreement.

Conard. Robert A.. M.D.. et al. A Tu enn

Year Review of Medicaid Findines in a Mar-

shatlese Population Accidentally Exposed

tu Radivactive Fallout. Brookhaven Nationai Laboratory. Washington. D.C.. Department of Commerce. 1978: available

from National Technical Information Service.
Congress of VMicronesta Speceal Joint Cummittee Concerning Rongelap and Ctirtk:
1973 Repurt. Kolonia, Ponape 96941: The
Congress.

Detroit Free Press. Sept. 2. 1978.
Gensuikin (Japan) Medical Survey Team. Re-

port on the Invesugation of Damage Done
by the Biuint Hvdroeen Bomb Test to me

Peopie of tre Marshall [ytands. rev. ed.,
Tokvo. Japan: Gensuikin, 4th f.. Akimoto
Bldg..
2-19 Tsukasa-Che.
Kanda.

Chivoda-ku. Tokyo. i973.
Honolulu Advertiser. Oct. 10, 1978: June 16.
20. 21. and 22, 1977; March 19. 1978. July

30, 1978.
International Herald Tribune, April i9. 1978.

Kiste. Robert C. The Bikimians: A Study in

Forced Migration. Mento Park. Ca.: Cummings Publishing Co.. 1974.

Lawrence Livermore Laboratory. Dose Assessment at Bikint Atoll. UCRL-51879 PL.
Washington. D.C.: Department ot Commerce. June. 8. 1977: available from Na-

tional Technicai Information Service.
Los Angeles Times, June 11, 1977.
McHenry. Donald F Micronesia. Trust Be-

traved. Washington, D.C.. Carnegie Endowment for [nternationa: Peace. i975.

Micronesian Independent, Sept. 12. 1975.
New York Times, March 23, 1978.
Washington Post. March 23 and 2°. LOTR,
April 3. 1978.
February 1979

The Bulletin 15

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