more, Travis AFB, Cape Canaveral, and San Diego, to name a few.
Table 3.1 lists the key personnel of TG 7.1.
3.3.
PLANNING AND TRAINING
Programs, Schedules, and Concepts. Planning for Operation Hardtack
essentially started during Operation Redwing as ideas for {mprovement of
operations were generated by the participants in the test area. These ideas,
for example, involved the use of Taongi to offset delays caused by weather
and fallout problems, and use of separate atolls by the two weapon labora-
tories to improve the continuity of effort and reduce the excessive commuting
between Bikini and Entwetok.
By the fall of 1956, the DOD had decided on five shots it planned to
sponsor and on the major effects projects it proposed to carry out on Hardtack. At the end of January 1957, the Eniwetok Planning Board considered
those 5 shots plus 12 sponsored by LASL and 14 by UCRL as the total program for the 1958 EPG operation. By June of 1957, the general concept of
the operation had been evolved and was published for planning guidance, listing a total of 27 shots. This initial shot schedule was revised three times
before publication of the Task Group's Operation Plan in January 1958 and,
prior to the first detonation of Hardtack, two more changes to the shot
schedule were issued. During the entire period 10 revised shot schedules
were published, listing the latest available information on ready dates and
expected yields, with pertinent remarks as to zero locations and shielding
for the different devices and weapons.
Detailed planning for diagnostic and effects programs was, of course,
slowed down as a consequence of the constantly changing shot schedule.
It
was further complicated by the competition for the experimenter's time when
he was deeply involved in the Plumbbob operation in Nevada. Late decisions
on whether or not to use Taongi, and on establishing the starting date for the
operation as either April 1 or May 1 also served to hinder planning.
By the start of the operation, however, there had evolved the following
more important concepts affecting operational planning and determination of
requirements:
1.
Both Bikini and Eniwetok Atolls would be used as shot sites for
megaton as well as smaller yield shots. UCRL would conduct {ts tests on
Bikini, while LASL would operate on Eniwetok - each independent of the other.
2. The DOD high altitude missile shots would be launched from Bikini
Island, and the high altitude balloon shot would be fired from the USS Boxer
between the two atolls.
The two underwater shots would be detonated in the
vicinity of the southern islands of En{wetok.
DE
3. General evacuation of Bikini Atoll would take place for four
shots, the UCRL Sycamore and Poplar devices, and the two high al__ titude missile weapons.
4.
<A capability of conducting Iimited operations afloat while Bikini was
evacuated would be maintained, as would an emergency evacuation capability
for both atolls.
Two major changes in these concepts occurred after the operational
phase started. Most drastic was the decision to transfer the Redstone missile shots to Johnston Island in order to reduce the flash blindness problem.
Later in the operation it also became necessary to transfer some of the
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