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much difference to the USSR as to the deterrent? Since we have linited resources, we must concentrate on those measures which might
deter attack rather than on shelters, which will not stop an attack.
As the President had suggested, we should study what we should do to
survive.
Governor Stassen said our deterrent policy was our most important policy and the one on which prime emphasis showld be placed.
But we should not put all our eggs in one basket. A nuclear war
might occur despite our deterrents. Then the key question would become: Do we survive and rebuild? The key to survival is protection
against radiation. The demoralizing effect on rebuilding would be
great when it was realized that the Government had done nothing to
provide shelters. We should move forwerd with our allies on fallout
shelters, subject to the maintenance of our deterrent power.
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Mr. Cutler recalled thet the shelter problem had been be-
. fore the Council e number of times, and various studies had already
increased retaliatory power; (2) to adopt the concept of fallout
shelter as a modification of our civil defense policy and ask interdepartmental committees to study the development of a specific program.
Mr. Cutler felt studies were not needed on two aspects of
the problem:
(1) the psychological effect of a U. S. shelter program
on our allies, because no one was more competent on the subject than
the Secretary of State; (2) the impact on the American people, because
the advice available at the Council table was superior to that of any
panel.
The President said that damage on the scale reflected in
the Net Evaluation studies meant the complete paralysis of the country, and there would be no reason for shelters. On the other hand,
if active defense measures could bring the problem down to manageable proportions, so that some cities, same commmications, etc.,
would survive, then shelters might add to survival. It would be
silly to talk of recuperation if everything was destroyed. We could
also destroy Russia, and the result would be two wounded giants doing nothing. Casualties of the magnitude being talked about would
mean that civilization could not be rebuilt in ea century--or even
two centuries.
Mr. Cutler said he gathered there was no disposition on
the part of the Council to reject the concept of shelter. As he saw
it, it was the feeling of the Council that the concept of shelter
should be incorporated in civil defense policy; that it was not yet
Clear what the Federal Government should do; and that a specific
program, with the initial steps spelled out, should be brought back
to the Council for consideration.
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‘been called for and presented to the Council. He thought that two
possibilities remained: (1) to reject shelter in favor of a greatly