mation received from contributing intelligence agencies were provided the Task Force
Commander by the Intelligence Division of the Department of the Army.
A comprehensive counter-intelligence plan was an essential step in the Task Force’s
security program. This plan was devised to include a continuing security control of personnel within the Task Force, and the establishment of rigid travel control within the operating areas, including Kwajalein, which was the gateway to the test area itself, Eniwetok.
Security control of documents, photographs, and material and security control of information and communications were included in the counter-intelligence plan.
The implementation of the security plan was a function of all units and personnel,
subject to staff direction by the J-2 Section. The various Task Groups were assigned specific security missions within their respective capabilities. Voluntary censorship was decided upon early in the operation and appropriate indoctrination measures were instituted
to insure an appreciation on the part of individuals of the importance of their position in
maintaining security.
Of primary concern in the security program was the physical security of AEA Restricted Data during all phases of the operation.
Preparation for the movement of fissionable materials, weapon components and related
equipment from the Pacific Coast to the Marshall Islands were, of necessity, made in considerable detail. Accomplishment of the other elements of the physical security mission
involved the establishment of control points at Washington, D. C., Long Beach, California,
Fort Shafter, Oahu, T. H., Kwajalein, and Eniwetok, Security detachments were required
aboard the four major ships of the Task Force. Thus, security protection was established
at points extending over a distance of 7,000 miles.
As the scope of the physical security requirement became apparent, it was realized
that a special operating unit was required. carefully selected officers and men had been
assembled to perform this mission and, as the realization for the need of a special unit
grew, these personnel were organized into a Joint Security Group and designated Task
Group 7.6. Lt. Col. Philip R. Cibotti was placed in command of this unit.
As materials and components of the weapons were moved aboard ship for the movement to the test area, “exclusion” and “restricted” areas were established where these
items were stored. Marine guards were employed to enforce security in these areas.
Essentially, the responsibilities assigned to TG 7.5 after the Task Force moved forward were:
1. The protection of AEA “Restricted Data” ashore. This included the numerous installations of the proving ground and all other materials of a classified nature.
2. The conduct of periodic security surveys of the island.
3. Continuance of the “Q” clearance and “p” approval personnel security clearance
program.
4. Conduct of air and water travel controls.
5. Continuance of the personnel security indoctrination program.
In the accomplishment of its mission, TG 7.5 placed guards on all zero islands and other
sensitive islands, controlling both entry into and exit from these islands. Al] islands of
the atoll, aside from Eniwetok Island, were subjected to weekly inspections or security
sweeps.
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