SECTION 8 SECURITY—INTELLIGENCE-PUBLIC INFORMATION The security policy established by the Atomic Energy Commission, in the late summer of 1947, for Operation Sandstone required The Commander, Joint Task Force Seven, by direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, positively to prevent the disclosure of the existence of the Task Force or of the operation, as such, for a period of approximately two months. The security policy placed the target date for a particular test in a “Top Secret” classification, and the location of the test site and the general time for conducting tests were classified secret. 1’ The practical result of this policy was to place a blanket of secrecy over the entire operation from the beginning of October until 1 December 1947, when it became necessary to announce to the public the existence of the Task Force. With the formation of the Joint Proof-Test Committee in late September 1947, it had been planned to make an early public announcement concerning the operation, which would relieve the early complications of the high security classification. Due to the international situation at that time, however, it was considered by the Department of State to be detrimental to the national interest of the United States to make such a disclosure. The Security Council of the United Nations was then in session and General Hull, therefore, made a commitment to the State Department to attempt to maintain absolute security for six weeks. This situation was further complicated, however, by an unexpected extension of the Security Council’s session to the point where it overlapped the convening of the Four Power Foreign Ministers’ conference in Imndon, It was felt by the State Department that public disclosure of the operation might also have an adverse effect on this conference. Through the exercise of rigorous security measures, secrecy was maintained during the six-week period to which General Hull committed the Task Force (14 October to 1 December 1947). By the end of November, however, it became apparent that secrecy as to the existence of the Task Force could not be maintained further and, with State Departa brief public announcement was made on 1 December. ment concurrence, This in no way relieved the Task Force of the necessity to maintain the basic security poiicy, however, nor did it diminish any of the requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (Public Law 585, 79th Congress) to protect the security of atomic information classified by this Act as “Restricted Data,” and defined as being: “All data concerning the manufacture or utilization of atomic weapons, the production of fissionable material, or the use of fissionable material in the production of power, but shall not include any data which the (AEC) Commission from time to time determines may be published without adversely affecting the common defense and security.” Viewed against the background of international tension that prevailed throughout the conduct of Operation Sandstone, the responsibilities of the Commander, Joint Task Force Seven, for maintenance of security were not to be regarded lightly. The

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