SEW
F
be the firing pi..
s for the weapons. Construction of the causeway to link the islands
of .Aomon and Biijwi was in preliminary stage.
In the meantime, agreement had been reached with the State Department on 19 December that a danger area would be declared around Eniwetok, extending 100 miles east and
west and 75 miles north and south from the center of the atoll. This was the area that had
been decided upon as offering a reasonable safeguard against dangerous radioactive contamination and unwanted observation. This action was publicly announced on 30 December.
All foreign governments were formally advised of this action, as were domestic agencies
such as the Hydrographic Office.
General Hull returned from the Forward Headquarters at Fort Shafter to Washington
on 13 December. After orienting the staff, he stated at the regular conference that the
Task Force had now passed from a planning to an operating stage.
At the staff conference on 19 December, General Hull announced that he would return
to Oahu that day and would again visit the forward area early in January. At that time he
announced that JTF Main would close in Washington on 15 February and open at Fort
Shafter, Oahu, T. H., at the same time. A Rear Echelon would open on 16 February in the
control section of the Plans and Operations Division, Department of the Army.
On 6 January 1948 agreement was reached between the Joint Task Force and the
Atomic Energy Commission which settled finally and for all the quetsion of command responsibility. This question revolved around a proposal raised during the early formaiton
days of the Task Force that the Scientific Director have the final authority in controlling
the amount of radiological exposure to which an individual could be exposed.
Replying to the AEC on this proposal, the Joint Task Force pointed out that such a
split command authority was neither feasible nor desirable since the Commander, Joint
Task Force Seven, held ultimate responsibility.
AEC agreement to this philosophy constituted, in fact, a final approval of the Task
Force’s basic plan, although general agreement had been indicated on 27 October when the
exception was made.
General Hull did not return to Washington after his departure on 19 December until
after completion of the operation. During the period 4 to 9 January 1948 he again inspected the progress of construction at Kwajalein and Eniwetok.
At Kwajalein various details were gone over with Captain Vest, Island Commander.
It was decided that Captain Vest should be furnished a Letter of Instructions to include:
1. An outline of construction to be undertaken and priority of accomplishment. (Some
construction was underway at this time. )
2. An outline of the command and responsibility agreements. (Colonel Barney was to
be a Deputy to Captain Vest. )
3. Call for Iscom Kwajalein to give maximum support to the Rongerik-Maj uro weather detachments.
Jleans of tightening security were discussed and arrived at during these conferences.
Ilean\vhile, construction had gone ahead on tent camps for the construction crews,
clearing of construction sites for housing the Air Task Group and renovating the mess hall
for the Task Group. A major shipment of material and equipment had arrived on 28 December 1947, including lumber, cement, vehicles and graders, permitting construction to
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