At this time it was also decided that the initial construction force for Eniwetok would
be a Provisional Battalion, primarily Engineers and ,Stevedores, plus Naval and Air attachments, to be commanded by Major William A. Hussey, who also accompanied General Hull’s
reconnaissance party. It was further established that USARPAC would make issue of
equipment and supplies to the initial force with provision that LTSARPACcould requisition
“on port” the items needed from the Zone of Interior.”
General Hull’s party arrived at Kwajalein on 25 October. The Island Commander,
who was also to serve as a Task Group Commander for Joint Task Force Seven, and the
local Air Commander were oriented as to the general nature of support which would be
required of them.
On 27 October the party arrived at Eniwetok where it was found that facilities existed to accommodate a force of 4,000 to 5,000 men. These facilities, however, were in a
bad state of repair and deterioration. An initial plan of work for Major Hussey’s provisional battalion was laid out. Later this was implemented by General HuH in a Letter of
Instructions.
A1l islands of the atoll were reconnoitered and zero islands for the tests were selected
on the spot. The island of Engebi was selected as number one zero island, Aomon-Biijiri as
number two, Runit as number three and Parry as the firing and control station.
On the return trip General Hull again conferred with the Kwajalein Island Commander and arranged to place a Joint Task Force Liaison Officer there to receive personnel enroute to Eniwetok and to receive Sandstone shipments of supply and equipment.
The party returned to Oahu on October 29 and additional conferences were held to
clarify new details of support for the operation.’ General Hull enunciated at this time a
general policy that all construction, repair and rehabilitation in the forward area must be
for the purpose of supporting the operation, but that proper relation to long-range development would be observed.”
Meanwhile, Colonel Barney had gone to Kwajalein to make estimates of supplies and
equipment required to meet the needs of Task Group 7:4. These supplies were to be procured locally insofar as possible and the remainder were to come from the Zone of Interior.
During this period the staff in Washington was concerned with step number two-the
development of details and completion of the plan. Specifically, this involved:
1. Initiation of a personnel procurement program; establishment of an efficient personnel administration system; and the adoption and inauguration of personnel policies.
2. Establishment of adequate security policies and measures.
3. Drafting of an overall plan to cover the entire Operation.
4. Establishment of procurement and shipping procedures and policies and their inauguration.
5. Finalizing the status of funds for the operation.
6. The establishment of service tests desired by the Army, Navy, Air Forces an~
Armed Forces Special Weapons Project.
Upon General Hull’s return to Washington the bulk of these matters was well along toward solution. The personnel program had been initiated. General Ogden’s Second Engineer Special Brigade had been alerted and procurement of additional personnel to augment
u 13Daily
Record, Joint Task Force Seven.
35