BACKGROUND OF OPERATION SANDSTONE
Pressure of time imposed a dominant weight upon Operation Sandstone from the moment of its conception on 3 April 1947 until its consummationjust a little more than a year
later when the final test was successfully completd on 15 lMay 1948. Actually, the compulsion of time was even greater than is indicated, for Joint Task Force Seven, which conducted the operation, did not come into being until 18 October 1947.
The General Advisory Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission on 3 April 1947
concurred in the recommendations of the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory that new atomic
weapons be developed to the point where tests could be conducted in early 1948. This proposal was placed before President Truman on 27 June 1947 by Mr. David E. Lilienthal,
Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and Brigadier General James McCormack, Jr.,
Director of the Division of Military Application of the AEC.L A preliminary test program
was approved by the President on that date. Subsequently, in the July semiannual report
to the Congress by the Atomic Energy Commission, it was announced that an atomic weapon proving ground would be established in the Pacific.
Continuing developments resulted in Mr. Lilienthal’s addressing a letter on 28 July to
Lieutenant General L. H. Brereton, Chairman of the Military Liaison Committee, requesting assistance from the Armed Forces in connection with the projected proof-testing.
Mr. LiIienthal specifically asked that this assistance include recommendations regarding the designation of a test site, the designation df a planning group or commander within
the Armed Forces with whom plans could be made for the conduct of the tests; and the
readying of certain units to assist in conducting the operation.z
PRELIMINARY RJXOMMENDATIONS FOR ORGANIZATION
General Brereton replied for the MLC in a memorandum to the AEC on 7 August
1947,3 in which it was noted that the AEC had established a security policy which placed the
target date for a particular test in a TOP SECRET classification. The location of the test
site and the general time for conducting tests were classified SECRET. The fact that routine tests will be made and that a proving ground is being established in the Pacific area
was unclassified. In compliance with Mr. Li]ienthal’s request, this paper recommended that
the Joint Chiefs of Staff appoint a special committee to draft the necessary policy instructions to the components of the Armed Forces. The memorandum also presented detailed
specifications and characteristics deemed essential in the selection of a test area. These
specifications provided that the location to be selected should be available as a permanent
proving ground. It was also specified that the location be in an area not usually exposed to
storms and that prevailing winds and currents be such as to minimize the deposit of radioactive particles on nearby inhabited land masses. Bikini was ruled out at once as a prospective site. Roi-Namur of the Kwajalein Atoll, and Eniwetok Atoll were viewed as possibilities. Other recommendations were made concerning the conduct of the tests. This memorandum was referred to the Joint Staff Planners.
LAFCfiles.
s 3 JCS 1795 series.
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