f
It is not the purpose here to consider the details of the execution of the Task Force
security. However, the execution of these measures, as previously stated, was a function
of all echelons of the command. Naval, Air and ground security measures were exercised by
the concerned Task Groups, 7.2, 7,3 and 7.4. These actions are considered to some extent in
Section 11 of this report. More detailed discussions are to be found in the individual reports
of these units which are contained in Part Two of Annex One to this report. An overall
consideration of security and intelligence is presented in the report of the Assistant Chief
of Staff, J-2, contained in Part One of Annex One to this report.
To summarize briefly the effectiveness of the security provisions devised and executed
by the Task Force, the following can be stated:
1. There was no evidence of intrusions of foreign aircraft into the operational area
during the course of the operation.
2. No verified reports were received at Joint Task Force Headquarters as to the presence of any foreign surface vessels within the danger area during the period of operations.
3. No evidence was developed during Operation Sandstone which indicated that any
AEA Restricted Data or classified military information under Task Force control was obtained by a foreign power on unauthorized person.
4. The entire operation, from its inception to its completion, was free of any incidents
of sabotage.
5. Submarine reconnaissance of the test area apparently was conducted by an unidentified foreign power. (Discussion of this effort is corItained in Section 11 of this
report). It is conceivabley possible that submarine crew members or passengers may have
been able to study the more prominent structures of the proving ground, such as Zero
Towers, Timing Stations, and Photographic Towers. However, it is believed improbable
that observations of this type were productive of any serviceable intelligence information
which would be classified AEA Restricted Data.
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