cue
A
ge SORT
ot Agee dtto become involved in the Syrian picture and had been worried by
Soviet opposition to the union, but had favored the union as a
means of warding off Communism in Syria.
The Syrians had been
motivated by Pan-Arab nationalism, and by the Syrian Army's fear
of eventual Communist control of Syria. The new union would be
faced by serious economic problems and by the problem of finding
jobs for army officers, and would be split geographically by
Israel.
General Cabell said that reactions to the Syrian-Egyptian
union had been varied. The Arab peoples viewed the union as the
first step toward the long-sought goal of Arab unity.However, 9,
e e cern r eens
ic. eee
ficial Arab reactions were cautious. [ol
eae
7
.
TT
ee
Israel looked upon the union with disfavor, but its public
‘utterances were cautious.
The Syrian Commmists were unhappy with
the union, but had to support it. The USSR, so far non-committal,
would probably support the union formally, but would oppose it behind the scenes.
General Cabell then noted that Khrushchev was proposing
a gradual transformation of the Soviet Machine Tractor Stations.
These 8000 stda-owned central pools of agricultural machinery,
worth $7 billion, had since the '30s been the principal instrument
of the Central Government's control over the rural areas. Khrushchev proposes to sell the machinery to the collective farms, in defiance of Stalin's warning against such a course. This move, which
had been recommended to the USSR by a U. S. agricultural delegation
in 1955, should reduce cost and increase agricultural production.
The Machine Tractor Stations were no longer needed for political
control, since thousands of Communists had been installed as the
heads of the collective farms. The transformation of the Machine
Tractor Stations might force into the open the last Stalinist
forces, a development which Khrushchev has favored.
General Cabell said that in Venezuela the government junta
had restored comparative calm. The predominantly civilian cabinet
enjoyed public and military support.
Free elections and constitu-
tional government within three months had been promised; the Liberal
parties were objecting to this much delay.
The Communists had been
prominent in the ouster of dictator Jimenez and had gained consider-
able political influence. The government was regarding the 1956 oil
concessions as illegal and insisting upon their renegotiation.
t
!
ra
a At 1A Bagyene
General Cabell noted that the danger of post-election violence in Guatemala had been reduced by an agreement between Ydigoras
and Cruse, an” agreement motivated by the realization that only in
this way could violence be avoided, since Ydigoras would use force