RADIATION STANDARDS, INCLUDING FALLOUT

320

Representative Price. What is the nature of these accidents?

The 22?

Mr. Parxer. They were wide and varied. The early ones occurring
were manipulation of weapons parts. Others came from accidents
with plutonium- or uranrum-bearing -solutions in various vessels
spread around many of the principal sites of the Commission. The
so-called Y—12 incident is in here. Many of the incidents at Los
Alamos are included in here.

Representative Price. Will you be absolutely certain before we

complete the record to have the accurate figures in here?
Mr. Parger. I will see that the figures are reviewed and accurate
figures given.
(The information requested follows :)
GENERAL ELEcTRIC Co.,
ATOMIC PRropucts DIVISION,
Washington, D.C., June 7, 1962.

Hon. MELVIN PRICE,
Chairman of the Subcommittee on Research, Development and Radiation of the
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.
Dear Mr. Price: During the hearings on radiation protection before your committee on Wednesday, June 6, I was asked to give assurance of the completeness
of a table II—U.S. Criticality Accident Experience, which appears in the appendix to my submitted material entitled “Radiation Protection Standards: The
Industrial Situation.”
The subject data were taken principally from reference 12 of my report which
is “A Summary of Industrial Accidents in U.S. AEC Facilities,” Division of
Operational Safety, TID-5360 supplement 3, revised December 1961.
On page 7 of that document appears a listing of 21 criticality accidents divided
into 4 categories, viz:

Metal systemsin air_

--

---

-

Solution systems
Inhomogeneous water moderated systems..._-.-_-_-.-.---.--.--------Miscellaneous systems
woe
eee
Total___._-.-_.---

5

8
5
3
21

In transcribing these into the chronclogical table used in table II, an unaceountable error was indeed made. Instead of one incident each in the years
of 1956 and 1960, the record should show two in 1956 and none in 1960.
I appreciate the opportunity to correct the record.
The total of 22 incidents given is believed to be correct. It adds the incident
oceurring at Hanford in 1962 to the previous list. This belongs in the “solutions
systems” category.
As indicated in the hearing, the three fatalities in 1961 do refer to the SL-1
incident. Reference 12 does not in itself identify the number of fatalities. A
separate check indicates that the total of six given in table II is correct to the
best of our knowledge. I would appreciate being informed of any data which
contraindicate this.
Very truly yours,
H. M. PARKER,
Manager, Hanford Laboratories.

Representative Prick. What does this cover? It does not cover the
whole area of the atomic energy program ?
Mr. Parker. This only covers a situation in which an accident
occurred because a critical mass was brought together inadvertently.
Representative Price. It would not cover normal industrial accidents in atomic energy ?
Mr. Parxer. No, sir. Only those in which a critical mass is accidentally brought together.

* >.esngevepigloasttstage

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