aan f TOP SECRET Ina philosophical vein, the Preeident observed that when you look at this little finger of South Korea sticking out of mainland Asia, you recall that the statement made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff ten years ago is as true today as it was then--namely, the statement that while Korea is of no military importance to us in general war, it is psychologically and politically of such importance that to lose it would run the risk of the loss of our entire position in the Far East. Accordingly, we have got to carry on in South Korea. Mr. Cutler then pointed out that there remained one more split in NSC5702/1 which should be resolved. [iiiiiiiiiitirtissrrrses Shen e este ee nas eet eee mee er we ee teh Bee een eae e er eanee Ce ee eer ee eee ee mepes i ee ee eee en meee tae ee Sree eee tee ee ee eee eee mw ere a eee mee eee . eee Ee eee ee he ber ee ene ero eee ee eee tte te tte ee ee eee wee [oR eee ee ee me et ae a ee a a ee Pe eee meh eee Secretary Dulles stated that this difference of opinion brought to mind a saying frequently used by the President, to the effect that "Planning is essential, though the plans themselves may not be important." If war were to start again in Korea, said Secretary Dollies, it was going to be very hard indeed to determine which side had begun the war. Accordingly, while it was desirable to have all these plans of action in mind, it was not going to be: easy to determine now, in advance of the event, precisely what courses of action would be mandatory on the United States. : The President commented that the best thing to insert here was what the French had said to the Russians at the outbreak of war in 1914, that is: terests." "France will do whatever is in its ow best in- The National Security Council: &. —_ a; ~ > e. et F \ | ' . e Discussed the proposed revisions of paragraphs 9, 10 and 19 of NSC 5702/1, prepared by the NSC Planning Board and transmitted by the reference memorandum of August 5, 1957; in the light of the Interim Report on Korea (transmitted by the reference memorandum of July 30, 1957), the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (tranamitted by the reference memorandum of August 7, 1957), and the comments of General Lemitzer at the meeting. z (s] h ao - 13 - , TOP SECRET a Ef | ef et i = a ny om H fH 1-4 a & OU Dp a oO fe hd oy [a P Dietnts Aten ath ates. pa asa pineTET ates oeao *