Brig. General Alfred D. Starbird
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Additional Cost Implications:
a&
Bikini evacuation would be on a contingency (emergency)
basis, with transfer of the larger shots to Taongi.
b. logistical support would be increased. Full-time opera»
tional period ISD support would require two ships, with
the part-time support of a third LSD. The operation of
the proposed diagnostic ship and its re-supply would be
additional. Elimination of evacuation, re-entry, and
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recovery of Taongi shots, which would be required at
Bikini, will offset any boat pool, liaison aircraft, and
support cost occasioned by use of Taongi.
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The Air Operations of Task Group 7.4 (including the Sea
Air Rescue Elements), and the surface operations of
Task Group 7-3 would obviously be expanded.
We concur that an airstrip at Taongi is a necessary
incidental to original construction and for medical
evacuation and should be of future value for emergency
lendings of operational aircraft and to facilitate
future Taongi condition surveys. Amphibious aircraft
landing and take-off at Taongi are hazardous and un-
certain.
Movement of equipment and materials ashore
is difficult.
The evaluation of the proposal is necessarily one for DMA and
Commission decision. Except for our comments and estimates,
insofar as they may differ with the UCRL paper, we concur with
the statements contained within the proposal.
.
Of all the arguments presented in favor of using Taongi as a
major firing site in future Pacific operations, it seems obvious
that the most compelling one is that of increased safety to both
Marshall Island inhabitants and test participants. (Now that
UCRL has satisfied itself that they can obtain the minimal
required diagnostic measurements necessary for their use,/the .
fundamental, technical and operational reasons for not ha’
used
Taongi in the past no longer exist.’ It seems to this office that
the AEC would be in an almost indefensible position should an
(continued)
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