by the large quantity of fuel and oxidizer which is at all times a potential source of a fire of conflagration proportions, and second, by the
possibility that an erratic missile has the capability of direct impact
on either the firing bunker or the control center, both of which are manned.
With regard to fire, a number of precautions are appropriate. These precautions are standard practice at AFMTC and elsewhere, and have successfully
prevented serious accident throughout the history of the program. Facilities for isolating and controlling fire are being incorporated in the design
of the launching facility, and protection of personnel is adequately afforded
by the shelters which are a part of that facility.
Impact of a missile on the launch bunker is a clear possibility, especially during the early stages of flight. Aside from the geographical
improbability of impact at any specific point, a degree of control of this
situation is provided to the safety officer by the instantaneous visual
presentations of missile behavior, and by the command system for flight termination. The flight safety officer is thereby enabled to sense a developing
unsafe condition, and to command engine cut-off and separation of the missile
into its two major components, At the discretion of the Commander, JTF-7,
he may also be enabled to command fuel dispersion, which has the effect of
Gearing open the propellant tanks so that burning of most of the propellants
will occur before impact,
Although it is difficult to assign numerical values to probabilities
of the occurrences discussed above, it is noted that the risks involved are
not unique to the HARDTACK program, and in fact are regularly accepted on
behalf of civilian residents of the conmunities surrounding the AFMTC and
other missile firing installations in the continental United States,
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ATOMIC ENERGY ACT 1954
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