staff essential to maintain security services during the period July 1952 to May 6, 1953 when the GS-5 grade determination was pending and firm hiring commitments were not possible. Attrition during this period reduced the force from 425 to_365 and recruitment was resumed to introduce the first class of 25 inspectors at the GS-5 level on June 8, 1953. While the out-placement program resulted in transfer or promotion within SFO of some 36 members of the Protective Force after April 1953, there remained 224 personal history statements of membersof the force who expressed a desire for out-placement con- sideration and assistance. As normal recruitment and hiring plans for necessary replace- ments (at the GS-5 level) were resumed, it was possible to extend out-placementactivities; and copies of the personal history statements were forwarded to Washington Division of Organization and Personnel for coordinating consideration of these candidates on an AECwide basis. Despite all of these precautions, there was a coterie of inspectors on the Guard Force who, recognizing the inevitability of the downgrading action, sought to find ways of arresting or otherwise precluding accomplishment of such action by various appeals to top levels of the AEC management, as well as to the President and to the Congress. The basic concept underlying this approach for relief from application of any downgrading action by the Manager, SFO, tookthe form, in general, of an attempt to develop high-level concern for the basic integrity of the security administration at the installation at Los Alamos. Consequently, every effort was made by members of the group to establish for consideration by the higher authorities, implications that significant security requirements were being ignored and that the management decisions relating to downgrading action stemmed from judgments made by a management alleged to be incompetent to recognize the security needs of the installation, and that the evidence of such incompetence would be found, upon examination, reflected in mal-administrative security practices and in deficiencies in application of personnel policy alleged to be characteristic of the Los Alamos operation, if not indeed of SFO as a whole. The final step in what appears to have been a concerted plan of action on the part of this particular coterie, was to publicize in the local press all of the allegations which, up to that time, had been presented to higher authority, including additional allegations respecting breaches of AEC security requirements on the part of supervisory personnel. This press release was made prior to the time that appropriate internal administrative determinations through grievance procedure or other administrative investigations could be ac- complished by the AEC. The emergence of the press release happened to coincide with the arrival of investigators for the Joint Committee who had been assigned responsibility to examine the circumstances surrounding the allegations previously made directly to the Committee by certain members of the Protective Force. Under these circumstances, it was necessary to arrest internal administrative in- vestigations seeking to identify the source of the allegations and to assess them appropriately as to validity and as to necessary corrective action. It developed that certain individuals, who had identified themselves as spearheading the action undertaken by the aforementioned coterie, were willing to make disclosures directly and in confidence to members of the Joint Committee staff, but these individuals refused similarly to respond to administrative inquiries on the part of the AEC, The AEC inquiries were being conducted at the instance of the Manager of Operations by membersof his staff, and at his request by members of the Investigative Staff of the Controller. Similar recalcitrance was subsequently manifested in the course of inquiries by membersof a Special Investigative Committee appointed by the General Manager. This resulted in a situation where, despite every effort to encourage the members of the Force involved to proceed in an orderly and responsible fashion to assist the administrative investigation of the AEC, two individuals assurned an insubordinate position and disciplinary action resulting in separation of the two individuals became necessary. 15g DOe/Aus aga “ [G3