a been given to field office programs for P-approval (security approval for access to controlled areas but not to Restricted Data). A formal SF Bulletin on P-approval processing, including a much-needed set of criteria for determining eligibility, is now being developed for issuance at an early date. In addition to the basic clearance function, the SFO personnel security program provides controls over various other functions involving the individual employee. These include handling of security violation cases, and the security processing involved in foreign travel and military assignment of employees who have had access to Restricted Data. Document Control and Security Education As indicated in the 1950 report, document control problems inherited from MED days were considerable, and in 1950 the major effort was to assure that minimum AEC controls were placed in effective operation at all facilities. During the continuing expansion in the last three years document control measures in SFO have been increased. Present controls at Sandia, Kansas City, and Rocky Flats, in particular, exceed minimum standards by providing for accountability controls down through the Confidential and, in some cases, the Restricted classifications. An idea of the magnitude of this program may be gained from estimated data developed recently as follows: Top Secret Secret Confidential Restricted Total Classified Documents Currently on Hand in SFO 21, 069 5, 245,083 12, 878, 239 34,900,681 53, 045, 072 Yearly Production of Documents 7,470 1, 451, 355 2, 731, 625 11, 422, 638 15, 613, 088 The extensive accountability controls in effect at the larger installations have provided a relatively accurate check on unaccounted-for documents, which as of mid-1953 were as follows: Top Secret Secret Confidential Restricted Total 2 580 258 0 840 With respect to the above, it should be explained that reporting requirements are such that a document is reported as "unaccounted-for" in any circumstances whereinit cannot be located immediately, and documents so listed are generally misplaced within security areas, rather than missing in the sense that the information contained is exposed to compromise. Even though unaccounted-for documents are few as compared to the num- ber existing, intensive effort has been directed to locating or accounting for them. Re- cent studies of the over-all document situation, disclosing the tremendous volume of classified paperwork in our operation, has indicated the need for a re-examination and revision of the Classification and control systems, with goals of eliminating an apparent widespread tendency to overclassify, and assuringthat accountability and control prac- tices are realistic and economical as well as effective. a em ste Ne? Security education programs designed to insure knowledge and awareness of security requirements by all personnel have been extended throughout SFO. All employees at all major installations are given special security indoctrination upon entrance, at intervals i3/