The most important provision was extension of the Administrative Review Procedure privileges to applicants as well as to employees: This resulted, of course, in a marked increase in the number of cases processed toward hearings. Another provision prohibited preliminary confidential discussion of "Hold" cases with employers, without specific authorization from Washington. Such discussions had previously been conducted by some local security offices in cases involving character andhabits rather than loyalty information, with a view to determining if the employer would still wish to have the request for clearance processed. This new provision was good in net effect—the Commission was potentially open to criticism and embarrassment in the former practice—butit also resulted in an increase of the number of cases given the expensive and time-consuming "Hold" processing. In November 1950, Washington issued official "Personnel Security Clearance Cri- teria for Determining Eligibility," setting forth specific types of information that were to be considered substantially derogatory. The issuance of these criteria made possible more uniform evaluation of investigative reports at all offices and processing levels. In 1950, two permanent panels of Personnel Security Board members were set up in SFO, one in New Mexico and one in California. These board members, who serve on a consultant basis and are selected from representatives of scientific, legal, educational and business fields, provide the regional office with an "outside," objective evaluation in the Administrative Review process. In April 1952, the Atomic Energy Act was amended by Public Law 298, 82nd Congress, to provide that the Civil Service Commission conduct background investigations of all con-— tractor personnel except those in vitally important or sensitive positions. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, which previously had investigated all atomic energy clearance cases, continued to be assigned responsibility to investigate all AEC personnel and contractor personnel in sensitive positions. This division of investigative responsibility re- quired an extensive study of all contractor operations and categorization of positions according to degree of access to sensitive information. The FBI also retained investigative responsibility for cases involving possible disloyalty, and arrangements were set up for referral to the FBI for completion of any such cases that are initially investigated by the Civil Service Commission. . From the time this program went into effect, on July 1, 1952, through June 30, 1953, 7,268 requests for background investigation were submitted to the Civil Service Commission and 3,692 to the FBI. In the two prior fiscal years approximately 21, 000 requests had been submitted to the FBI. ewe During the past three years an estimated 700 ''Hold" cases have been processed through the regional office. Fifty-six cases have progressed to formal hearings. Favorable clearance determination has been made in 28 of these cases, unfavorable in 18, in 2 no decision was made due to cancellation, and 8 cases are currently pending final detervoce mination. The personnel security field is regarded in SFO as being of extreme importance, and continuing effort has been directed to increasing the over-all effectiveness of the program. Staff supervision of field office activities has been extended past the mechanical process- ’ ing of "Hold" cases to broad areas of guidance in evaluation of investigative reports, analysis of the security significance in various types and circumstance of derogatory information, methods of eonducting effective informal interviews, etc. Coordinating guidance has Dot/ALo . 136